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Manning Index of South Australian History
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    South Australia - Defence of the Colony

    See Also:

    South Australia - Sport - Rifle Shooting

    For an essay on the Military Road see under Port Adelaide - Military Road

    "The Services on Parade" is reported upon in the Advertiser, 1 September 1936 (special edition), page 47.

    Local Defence - 1837-1849

    (Taken from an unpublished manuscript by Geoffrey H. Manning entitled The Russians are Coming - The Defence of Colonial South Australia - copy in State Library.)

    The military history of South Australia actually began before the colony was founded because the provision of troops for the maintenance of law and order was one of the conditions of Colonel C.J. Napier's acceptance of the offer of being the first governor. He wrote:

    This demand was held to be at variance with the self-supporting principles of the new settlement and so Captain John Hindmarsh accepted the post. The defence of the colony was in the minds of Adelaide people from the time of the foundation of the colony and it is thought by military men that Adelaide was given parks by Colonel William Light as a defence precaution, the idea being that the colonials living around Adelaide would flee into the city which would be protected by trenches commanding an interrupted view of the parks over which the enemy would have to advance before taking the town.

    Even these epistles are not the beginnings of the story for those lie with Governor John Hindmarsh and ten marines from HMS Buffalo, whom he retained both as protectors for the embryo settlement and vice-regal guards. In the first task they were a signal failure and with the second a dubious success, for they were:

    PRG 280/1/15/190Having washed their hands of one lot of rascals the colony found itself somewhat in little better case when its next group of protectors arrived in the form of the first detachment of Imperial red coats - "Lobsters", the town boys called them. Captain Butler's company, the 96th Foot, Captain Haire (51st), Lieutenant Baker (51st) and others, together with 84 rank and file soldiers, arrived from Hobart on 17 October 1841. Captain Butler who, for a time, was private secretary to Governor George Grey, was reputed to be very severe in the treatment of his men and it was no unusual circumstance for several soldiers to be under punishment, confined to barracks, banished to knapsack drill and "other bothers", which annoyed them greatly. Indeed, extra police had to be enrolled to control the obstreperous guardians!

    Martial example fired Governor Gawler's long-entertained opinion that the peace, prosperity and good understanding of the colony would be advanced and maintained by the formation of a corps of volunteer militia and, with the arrival of a supply of small arms, the last difficulty was removed when an anxious citizen expressed his concern in 1841:

    So the Royal South Australian Volunteer Militia came into being, resplendent in scarlet, piped with blue. It is evident that the terms of enlistment were not attractive - the men had to bear the cost of their uniform, horse, fusil (light musket) and bayonet, drill an hour on three days a week until proficient, and stand the risk of fines.

    The first brigade of the volunteer militia was: Major Commandant - Thomas S. O'Halloran; Captains - Charles Berkeley (Cavalry), Boyle T. Finniss, (Light Infantry), Robert Ferguson, (Cavalry); Lieutenants - John William Holmes, Henry R. Wigley, Edward Rowlands, Adolphous McPherson, Andrew Berry and Edward C. Gwynne; Second Lieutenants and Cornets - Alfred Hardy, Charles W. Stuart and Frederick Hancock; Staff - Captains, Henry Nixon, C.W. Litchfield, Alexander Tolmer; Surgeons John Knott and James G. Nash; Privates - W.A. Poulden and William Hancock. The illustrious barrister, W.A. Poulden, however, was required to resign and "did so in a state of extreme disgust, when it was proven that he constantly came to drill when he was what was technically called "tight"." Thus, by one stroke of an unmagnanimous pen the fighting force within the lowest rank was reduced by 50 per cent!

    Recruiting languished and after the first ardour, which led a perplexed sergeant-major to order a parade of three "to form a square", had evaporated, the resplendent scarlet uniforms and pipe-clayed leggings were laid away. However, the Editor of the Southern Australian could not let the matter rest without a parting jibe:

    So ended the colony's first game of soldiers and many years later an old colonist recorded his views on the colony's first local defence corps:

    South Australia had emerged from near economic collapse in 1846 when a concerned citizen addressed the defenceless state of the colony and envisaged imposed slavery and pillaging by foreign aggressors:

    The year of 1847 was eventful when six field guns were imported from England in the Kalliboka, being the first of that type in the colony, while ninety men of the 11th Regiment arrived in the Brankenmoor from Launceston to relieve the 96th which departed for India. However, there appears to be no doubt that the new arrivals were cast in a similar mould to their predecessors; for example:

    In October 1848 seventy men of the 99th arrived under the command of Captain Reeves; the 11th regiment seems to have remained until 1854, while the 99th went to Western Australia. However, in mitigation it must be said that the boisterous 96th regiment was of some economic importance to the colony for at least £5,000 was expended annually by the officers and men.

    Also in 1848, the Legislative Council contemplated enacting a Defence Bill, but following adverse public criticism the project was abandoned and a citizen's response in the Southern Australian gave a fair and reasonable summation of its pros and cons:

    And so the 1840s concluded with the colonists turning their attention to more mundane subjects that did not include the provision for an army recruited from the citizens of the colony. Indeed, the working class were well aware that if such a force came into existence they would do any necessary fighting, while the colonial aristrocacy led from the rear.

    The Russians Are Coming!

    From the time of the Crimean War in the 1850s and at regular intervals thereafter a persistent concern among the citizens of South Australia was the fear of invasion by the Russians and, of necessity, the government was prodded and urged to make appropriate arrangements to meet the oncoming hordes from Asia.

    With the news of a deterioration in Anglo-Russian affairs having reached the colony in 1854 the Editor of the Register opined:

    When the Crimean War began the colony was without any adequate means for preventing a privateer's crew, with a moderate share of audacity and hardihood, landing on our coast. Fortunately, although the Russians had a small force in the Pacific they were "too anxious to get into safe quarters to attempt anything in the shape of enterprise"; but had the foe been the Frenchmen, who were politically, and otherwise, active in the islands of the Pacific Ocean:

    Wisely, within the upper echelons of colonial society, a volunteer corps was preferred to a forced militia and the government professed to hold out strong inducements for volunteers. However this may be, it was more than counterbalanced by the ridiculous allowances to those who might be called out - £2.12s. per annum for clothing and the enormous sum of one shilling per day, with each man to find for himself:

    Our legislature, convinced that events might possibly arise in which our safety or destruction would hinge upon our own conduct, introduced a Bill on 2 August 1854 to organise and establish a military force. This was assented to by the Lieutenant-Governor on 14 September 1854, while another provided for the raising of an ordinary militia. By the former Act the governor was authorised to levy a force of not less than 850 men.

    In response our vacillating Editor was to suggest that:

    while a cynical citizen posed a question:

    In retrospect, Mr W.R. Wigley of Glenelg was to give a satirical, but none the less serious, interpretation of the colony's shortcomings in the latter half of the 19th century:

    I think the "Military ones", of which there are several, might express their opinion upon "our defences". They have not done so at present.

    On 23 January 1889 at page 5h of the Register the following article appeared:

    The Fortified Coast

    Both were travesties of forts, for their designers, relying implicitly, apparently, on a problematical enemy playing fairly and attacking only from the front, had left the back unguarded so that the gunners on barbette were exposed to fire from the dunes. Largs, certainly, had a picket fence and Glanville, a caustic suggested, should be safeguarded by a notice - "This fort must not be attacked the rear."

    The subject of forts along the coast of St Vincent Gulf was first mooted in 1858 when a newspaper editor suggested that "at present all we require at present is the formation of small forts at certain defensible points of our coastline, which points we presume to be the two horns of the Bay at Glenelg." Mr William Gray, a storekeeper at Port Onkaparinga (modern-day Port Noarlunga), with a sense of patriotism, and perhaps an eye for increased business, addressed the government of the day:

    In 1864, £20,000 was voted by the parliament for the purchase of heavy guns of position for the defence of the colony against foreign invasion, or privateering attack, but a year later no steps had been taken to carry out the wishes of the legislature.

    It was unarguable that the defence of the colony had to be provided for and the opinion was passed - "let no one flatter himself that the Home government will do all that is requisite." There were two motives actuating that body towards its colonial possessions - the one parental affection; the other Imperial pride and many colonists did not have much faith in the former. The prior conduct of the Imperial authorities towards the colony showed that there was little, indeed, of parental anxiety for its welfare, but much talk of the "parent state", "the mother country" and so on, but at home the colonists in South Australia were looked upon not as children, but as dependants, as appendages.

    The colonies were "dependencies" and Great Britain could, doubtless, revenge itself for any insult offered to the British flag; but as revenge was necessarily subsequent to the wrong inflicted, Imperial pride would not save the colonies from ruin. After the colonies were degraded, outraged and ruined, England talked about "the honour of the flag", the "insult offered to the Crown" and so on, and took revenge upon the aggressor, with a view to satisfying wounded pride and restoring tarnished honour. The "parent state" was avenged in the eyes of the world, but that did not undo the wrongs inflicted upon unoffending and unprotected dependencies.

    History knew no other empire like the British and its vastness appealed even to the most unimaginative. The sun, literally, never set upon it; the Union Jack flew on all five continents and it covered more than one-fifth of the habitable globe and claimed about one-fourth of the entire population of the planet. No other nation had such a large number of people who had no voice in the ruling of their destinies, for of the 400 million subjects when King Edward VII occupied the throne, only 50 millions were self-governing, while the remainder dependend upon the goodwill of "the Mother Country."

    For a long time it was not even conscious of its own power or greatness and the development during the 19th century was so rapid that its rulers "stood aghast at the burden and responsibility of maintaining it":

    Such was the considered opinion of the British Empire as expressed in South Australia by a white Caucasian of British lineage at the turn of the 20th century. However, there would be little doubt that an opinion of a very different character would have been forthcoming from many of the "inferior races" being subjected to the whims and fancies of British dominion.

    In colonial South Australia many free thinking citizens did not trust England to take care of them. There was no mistake about that. And what did our legislature do? Nothing whatever. Year after year passed by and nothing was done. The colony was absolutely helpless in the water and an enemy with a very small force could have brought ruin without landing at all. In 1862, a report from Mr E.T McGeorge was laid before parliament in respect of defences for Port Adelaide and it said that in his opinion a battery should be installed at the northern end of Torrens Island which:

    Mr McGeorge also compared his proposed site with one previously recommended:

    Following this difference between self-professed experts the government backed away from the idea of fortifying Torrens Island and in the Assembly its members declined to go into Committee upon Mr Finniss's motion in favour of the purchase of a heavy battery. However, £4,000 appeared on the Estimates for procuring six 12-pounder Armstrong guns.

    By mid-1866 it was apparent that the legislators were completely puzzled by the numerous suggestions, reports and advice received over previous years. At first they inclined their ears to Messrs Thomas and Finniss, then to Captain Douglas, then to a Royal Commission and then again to Commander Parkin and even the voting of the sum for the fortress guns threw them into a state of perplexity:

    Commander Parkin of HMS Falcon, in a report on "The Best Means of Repelling an Attack on Adelaide and Port Adelaide by Armed Forces", recommended that three forts be constructed - one on Torrens Island and the others midway between the city of Adelaide and Port Adelaide and Glenelg. Some of the members of the Commission were strongly in favour of a military road from the Semaphore to Brighton, though they admitted that as a means of defence it would not be of much value "as would justify the recommendation of its construction solely for that purpose." Other members, however, reported that, in their opinion, whilst the construction of such a road was the very thing an enemy would desire, it would be of no use at all as a means of defence:

    But with all these and other suggestions at hand, and with money in their pockets, the government refrained from doing anything. Like Sancho Panza they had been unable, although hungry, to eat from the multiplicity of rich dishes set before them. They decided to wait for the arrival of an officer of the Royal Engineers, who was to "examine into our wants, harmonise the contradictions of all other authorities and then prepare some scheme that shall exactly suit us."

    In 1866 Sir William Wiseman came to Australia in HMS Curacao and in respect of the proposed forts said:

    Plans of the turrets recommended by Sir William Wiseman were prepared and carefully examined by Royal Engineers but "no turrets for coast defence had been tried by the British government" and, in this state of uncertainty, the colonial government was advised to proceed "one turret at a time." By November 1867 a battery of Whitworth guns were on the way to Port Adelaide and the two heavy Armstrong guns, with the revolving turret, in which they were to be worked, were "being got ready for shipment."

    The first fortress guns were landed at the SA Company's wharf and after lying for years in a shed in Nile Street, Port Adelaide, where there were neither carriages nor ammunition suited to them in the colony - nor could carriages be extemporised, but had to be imported from England. Finally, they were mounted in Fort Largs, but later condemned and removed. In passing, two Russian guns from Sebastopol were landed from the Benevue and after being in the Botanic Gardens for many years were removed to the parade ground at the rear of government house.

    Objections were made in the Legislative Council to the effect that the shock of a 200-pounder would throw down any masonry that could be built in this colony and that it would be useless to erect such a structure in the absence of large blocks of granite:

    Fortunately, this objection was founded on a misapprehension!

    Due to government procrastination, discussed in another chapter, the matter lay dormant until October 1876 when Mr James Boucaut's arguments for the commencement of defence works were denied and eventuated in £15,000 being struck from the Estimates, but in the following month an important debate took place when Mr Bower, the member for Port Adelaide, moved a motion that the government should, without delay, mount the two guns lying at Port Adelaide; this was duly carried.

    Fort Glanville and Fort Largs came into being at a cost of about £9,000 each and an abortive beginning was made with Fort Glenelg, the fate of which is discussed in another chapter. Glanville dates from 1880 and Largs from 1884. The siege guns, two of 10 inches, firing a 400 pound projectile at Glanville and two of 9 inches with a 250 pound shell at Largs, were retrieved from stores at Port Adelaide, where they had lain for more than ten years. They had been the subject of protest, jibe and doggerel, and, finally, at the cost of toil at capstan and winch, hauled the few hundred yards over the sandhills skirting Military Road to their emplacement. The foundation, military occupation and other historical factors surrounding the forts are discussed elsewhere.

    Also see Glanville, Largs and Glenelg

    The 1870s - Governor Jervois to the Rescue

    Strictly speaking it was not until the 1870s that anything like a thorough system of military defences suited to colonial conditions was entered upon. Beyond the temporary stay of detachments of Her Majesty's regiments and the formation of a volunteer force, as discussed in a previous chapter, during its first 29 years of its existence South Australia was destitute of any trustworthy means of defence.

    Much doubt prevailed as to whether a militia force could be called into existence without fresh legislation and, certainly, the question was not very clear. The 1854 Act had authorised the establishment of a militia, but was evidently intended to meet an existing emergency and not to be carried into effect unless the volunteer force, then established, remained below the minimum, or unless in case of invasion or imminent dread of it. The amending Act of 1859 was passed, providing that it should be lawful for the governor to bring the Act of 1854 into effect by proclamation at any time. Therefore, for certainty's sake it appeared essential that a new Bill should be passed.

    In November 1870 a debate was held in parliament on military defences and it led to the usual conflicting expressions of opinion as to the use or uselessness of defences generally, and the relative merits of a militia and a volunteer force. The upshot was the striking out of the whole item in respect of military Estimates - a practical endorsement on the part of the Assembly of that laissez faire system of which Mr Duffield had always been the leading exponent. However, this retrograde action had many critics:

    The alarm of a difficulty with Russia, backed, perhaps, by the encomiums bestowed by the London Times upon the energy of our neighbours in Victoria, stimulated the South Australian Government to make another effort to put the colony in a posture of defence when, on 4 January 1871, the Legislative Council adopted the motion of the Chief Secretary affirming the desirability of the government taking steps during a forthcoming recess to provide for the defence of the colony, either by embodying a force not exceeding 1,000 men under the Militia Act, or by accepting the service of such volunteers as might be willing to enroll. However, inaction was the order of the day!

    Notwithstanding, in a token gesture, the rifle association was permitted the use of Enfield rifles in the Armoury and were supplied with ammunition, free of charge. Teaching of drill in public schools was undertaken and to Mr Madeley of the Model School credit must be given as being the first to introduce the scheme upon any extended scale in the colony. His actions bore fruit when the Education Board directed that drill should form one of the branches of instruction in licensed schools. And there the matter rested until 1875 when the Commissioner of Public Works proclaimed that the government was "doing all it could to obtain information as to a thorough scheme of defence, and it was generally agreed that the whole subject called for early consideration."

    The Russian scare freshened up the flagging spirits of the old volunteers, who had grown rusty for want of work on the parade ground, and many had found solace with the mild excitement afforded by a rifle association. Public attention was directed forcibly to the colony's defenceless state and pressure brought to bear upon the government to take the matter in hand.

    A demonstrative meeting was held in the Adelaide Town Hall, where it was decided to petition the government to secure the re-establishment of a defence force and this culminated in a reorganisation of the troops, the first enrollment taking place on 31 May 1877, the artillery being the first arm of the service formed. The British government, at the instance of South Australian authority, recommended Colonel Downes, Royal Artillery, as commander and Major Godwin, of the 103rd Regiment Royal Bombay Fusiliers, as adjutant of the local forces. Those officers arrived towards the end of 1877 and at once took charge of the volunteers, who had previously been commanded by Colonel Biggs.

    In consequence of the feeling of insecurity in the colonies, Sir W.F.D. Jervois, later to be governor of South Australia, and Colonel Scratchley were, early in 1877, appointed by the Home Government to visit the Australian colonies and furnish a report upon the means of defence best suited to their circumstances. They departed from England on 3 May 1877 and, subsequently, a memorandum on defence was laid before the South Australian House of Assembly on 12 December 1877.

    It recommended a land force to consist of 940 men; for land defences a battery for three heavy guns of 18 tons weight to be constructed on the sandhills near Semaphore, another for the two 12-ton guns already in the colony about three miles north of it; the completion of the military road from Lefevre Peninsula to Marino; a few electro-contact torpedoes to be placed across Port Creek and a supply of field guns. A further recommendation was for "the purchase of an ironclad" at a cost of about £150,000. Capital cost of the land defences was estimated at £35,000 (Semaphore battery, £10,000, Military Road, £15,000 and field guns, torpedoes, etc., £10,000) and an annual expenditure of £25,000.

    Both parties had made a meticulous search of the ground between Marino and Pelican Point and the conclusion came to was that the sites recommended by the Defence Commission of 1876 were best suited for the purposes, that is, one about 1,300 yards to the south of the Semaphore jetty and the other about 4,700 yards to the north.. Both these sites were on land reserved in previous years for defensive and other purposes. Sir William Jervois recommended that the best defence, generally, was more dependent on naval means than any other part of Australia and concluded that:

    The matter came before the Assembly in October 1878 when a Bill was presented providing for a permanent force of artillery or infantry to consist of about 80 men together with a volunteer reserve corps of 130, rank and file. The enlisted term was for either three or five years, extra pay being allowed to those who opted for the longer term. The appointment of officers rested with the governor and, as to the command of the permanent force, this proposal was subjected to severe criticism:

    In November 1878 Mr Bundey pointed out in parliament that South Australia was the only colony on "this side of the line" unable to defend itself and concluded by paraphrasing a popular rhyme and stating that unless some provisions were made "we would continue to say":

    And so the 1870s drew to a close with a hope in colonial hearts that the proposed plans for the defence of the colony were "on track" and destined for approval at home and abroad.

    The 1880s - The Years of Parliamentary Perambulation

    By mid-1881 large sums of money had been spent in procuring trustworthy means of defence; a fort, of which the colonists had every reason to be proud, had been constructed and fitted up in a manner comparing favourably with any other similar work, either in adjacent colonies or Great Britain. A volunteer corps had been maintained for more than three years and no pains spared to render its members effective in the event of their being compelled to take the field. Finally, a rifle association, governed by a general council, had been formed with the object of training its members to be useful to the colony in the case of emergency. But dissenting opinions were current as discussed later.

    At the same time, South Australia took the lead among the Australasian colonies in volunteering aid to the British forces engaged in upholding British supremacy in South Africa and young volunteers from South Australia offered their services in large numbers. But, on forwarding the offer to the Home authorities, they were rebuffed when Lord Kimberely, Secretary of State for the Colonies, said that the British government did not think it desirable to accept the services of volunteers in the Transvaal. Closer to home a local volunteer, unaware that there was no compulsion for him to seek "overseas experience", addressed the local press:

    The prime mover behind the call for enlistment was a Mr D.C. F. Moodie who explained:

    Later, in July 1882, Mr Moodie made formal application to the Chief Secretary and asked whether the government would be disposed to entertain the idea of equipping a mounted troop of South Australian guerillas with the title "Moodie's Gorillas [sic]", for the purpose of "worrying and impeding an enemy should he advance to Adelaide." Whether the offer was made with "tongue in cheek", under the influence of drugs, spirituous liquors or otherwise, the offer was solemnly rejected within the hallowed halls of the responsible Minister!

    By February of 1882, the prevailing position of defences of South Australia reminded many concerned citizens of the troubles of a resident in an Adelaide suburb. His garden was securely fenced and with one exception the gates had springs attached so as to ensure they were not left open. The one exception, an iron gate, did all the mischief. Indeed, one of the most striking, and at the same time one of the most common, evidences of human depravity was to be found in the circumstance that callers would not shut gates. The entrance in question was left open frequently for a few minutes and a flock of goats, those enemies of all horticultural operations, speedily took advantage of the opportunity, and promptly responded to the silent invitation offered by the unobstructed passage. The troubles of the resident in question were intensified by another cause.

    It was his lot to live on the borders of a district council adjacent to a municipality, the authorities of which were very strict in arresting and impounding all stray vagabond goats. The authorities of the district council were, unhappily, not so strict. Goats, like other members of the wandering larrikin tribe, were quick to note the difference and speedily made for the locality where they could carry on their depredations without fear of the pound, and where they would be sure of being unmolested by ranger or police.

    This homely story is narrated with the intention of it being an allegory. Indeed, to prove its underlying message, South Australia had done something in the way of defence; but she had not merely one, but several gates which offered a ready means of access to any marauding foe so inclined to visit our shores. Leaving Western Australia out of the question for the moment, she was, of course, the first of the Australian colonies which a vessel from the west could reach; and though she could not claim to be the richest of colonies. it hardly admitted of doubt that she was more vulnerable than either Victoria or New South Wales. In short, South Australia was like the unlucky resident whose case we have used as a moral.

    Not only were our entrances insecure, but the greater security of our adjoining neighbours rendered us more liable to become prey to a hostile force. Fort Glanville was, undoubtedly, well constructed and well furnished with warlike appliances, but it could not be said to be well manned. To an unprofessional person, the target practice of 4 February 1882 was not altogether satisfactory for "several rounds were fired with such precision that it would have been dangerous for any vessel which might have been in the vicinity of the range."

    Further, it was common for vessels to pass Cape Borda without being signalled. If any ship, coming with friendly intentions, had arrived with hostile intent, of what use would the fort have been? The facts were that our defence arrangements were miserably incomplete. As matters stood those responsible were leaving the front gate wide open and there was too much reason to fear that an enemy would find the inner gate. This was not creditable either to our common sense or our patriotism.

    From this indictment flowed a resolution to "ascertain the price at which a ship could be procured as was suggested in the memorandum prepared by Sir William Jervois." The debate in Parliament was clothed with drama; the Chief Secretary was accused of "sitting on the rail" and it was "melancholy to see such an important question treated in such a way":

    Eventually, it was left to Mr Fraser, in an earnest and vigorous oration, to move a motion to take immediate "remedial steps for the permanent defence of the colony". In the course of his speech he said:

    The government succumbed on 13 July 1882 when the Chief Secretary informed the House that the government had instructed the Agent-General to "ascertain the price at which a ship could be procured in the memorandum prepared by Sir William Jervois a few weeks since." At the same time the Editor of the Register commiserated with those who were prone to "bury their heads in the sand":

    In some echelons of colonial society regret was expressed to the form in which the motion was prepared because it bound the government to a particular course which, it was feared, would not accomplish all that was expected; indeed, many would have been more satisfied with the recommendation if it had been untrammeled by any condition.

    The Government Gazette of the 31 August 1882 contained the "rules and regulations for the discipline and government of the South Australian Military Force under Act No. 125 of 1878", or rather for the force to so be raised, for by 1882 it had not been enrolled. It empowered the governor to raise and maintain a permanent military force, to consist of not more than one major, three lieutenants and 130 rank and file, either artillery or infantry, and to enroll a reserve force to "consist of all such men as shall be willing to be enrolled therein", together with such members of the police force "as shall be willing to undertake military service in time of need."

    Early in September 1882 it was reported that gun emplacements, to the number of five or six, had been built at irregular intervals along the coast from Fort Glanville to Glenelg, access to which was gained from the military road by branches to each emplacement. "sooth to say, the feeders were in better condition for traffic than the road itself, which in many places was very heavy, owing mainly to the soft soil and its shifty character."

    In the same month a "Local Forces Bill" was before parliament and meetings of the Rifle Volunteer Force were held, the proceedings at which were of such a character as to negative entirely the view, entertained by some members of parliament, that the force was either indifferent to the passing of the Bill then before the Assembly, or that the provisions of that measure met with the general concurrence of those most interested.

    Outside of parliament Major Fergusson, in a manly, straightforward speech, gave a military view of the situation and Lt-Colonel Lovely, in a temperate and conciliatory fashion, suggested a way out of the existing difficulty, while the Editor of the Register commented:

    By mid-1884 the permanent force was composed of men who had joined as regulars and did their duty in the forts; at the close of that year the numbers were small, for the strength of the defence force was Cavalry-38; A Battery-100; B Battery (garrison)- 81; 11 companies of infantry - about 800 and about 600 Reservists. While the Russian scare persisted the volunteers were the heroes of the day; when it subsided they were targets for the ribald. And the target was broad, much broader in fact than the "blues" on the rifle butts on the south Park Lands, when a commander, needing a centre to win a match, missed the bulls eye, missed the target, missed the butt and wounded a cow browsing on the pasture beyond.

    Early in 1885 news was received that the Imperial government had accepted the offer of New South Wales to send a force to the Soudan and this greatly stimulated the ardour of the South Australian Volunteers. The South Australian government offered to send 250 fully equipped men, but there was a deal of dissent within the community:

    By mid-February 1885 a total of 278 men had volunteered and "further applications from ladies anxious to go as nurses have been received." However, the offer was refused by the Home authorities, but New South Wales was permitted to send its contingent which departed in the Iberia in March 1885.

    This rebuff from the Mother Country was contemporaneous with a further "Russian scare" when both citizens and the press expressed their misgivings and fears:

    In retrospect, Mr W.R. Wigley of Glenelg was to give a satirical, but none the less serious, interpretation of the colony's shortcomings at that time:

    By the end of March 1885 an unexpectedly rapid march of events had already modified the basis upon which colonial defences were planned by Sir William Jervois and Colonel Scratchley only a few years before. It was then assumed, as a matter of course, that the British Navy would effectually cope with all heavily armed and really formidable hostile vessels of war, and that the worst the colonies would have to defend themselves against would be the attack of a privateer or two which might elude the vigilance of British cruisers. In 1885, it was almost certain that if England was to become involved in a war with one or more of the great powers, with which her relations had become more or less strained, the Australian colonies would be liable to be attacked by a very much more formidable force than was contemplated when their defences were planned. To ignore this would have been exceedingly unwise.

    Members of Cabinet met on 1 April 1885 when the grave nature of the situation, in view of war being declared between England and Russia, was considered. The various details suggested by the military authorities in the colony were discussed and it was decided that steps should be taken at once to resist an attack by Russian vessels, should they visit our shores. With regard to the local military force it was intended to increase its numbers until the limit of 1,000 fixed by parliament was reached.

    Some colonial strategists considered that Russia would not send a sufficient number of men out here to fight us on land - "Her cruisers would simply visit our shores, do as much damage as they could with their big guns, and then decamp." However, instructions were given for the establishment of a night patrol between Fort Glanville and a point some distance south of Glenelg, while 48 horses, for eight field guns and four waggons, were put into more perfect training for artillery work; three field guns, horsed, were sent to Glenelg and the Kapunda infantry ordered to hold itself in readiness to come to town on short notice if wanted for immediate service.

    These deliberations were not reassuring. What was proposed was all very well in its way, but if the Ministry wished to atone for past neglect, and convince the community of their capacity to cope with the emergency, they should not have stopped there. Indeed, following public agitation, they finally condescended to give some closer attention to the subject:

    These complaints, given momentum by both morning newspapers, brought forth public criticism and, consequently, thoroughly aroused the government to the necessity for action and at subsequent Cabinet meetings it was decided that:

    To any unbiased observer the fact was that the government did not enter enthusiastically into the defence of the colony. What they had done was, apparently, from a desire to satisfy an excited public feeling with which they had, evidently, never sympathised. Indeed, there was an appearance of half-heartedness about their proceedings which nothing but the adoption of a more determined and unhesitating action would counteract. However, in defence of the government, in retrospect it must be said that, at the time, it was unfortunate that military enthusiasm in South Australia was apt to be evanescent. Sometimes, as was the case in 1885, it rose almost to fever heat under the exciting stimulus of sensational rumours of war and then cooled down until the enthusiasm all but vanished.

    In March 1886 it was proposed to alter the name of the Volunteer Military Force to the South Australian Militia Force, while in September of that year a Bill to consolidate and amend the law in relation to the defence forces was laid before the Assembly. It absorbed the vital provisions of eight Acts, which it repealed, borrowed numerous clauses from enactments in operation in New Zealand and Queensland and here and there took a leaf out of the latest book of Imperial regulations. Within it was to be found evidence of undue haste or carelessness and its drafting struck many as being contrary to the natural order of things:

    Towards the end of 1887 it was evident that the colonial military force was unusually small. The estimates of the previous year had provided for a force of 850 men and 58 officers, yet at the Queen's Birthday parade, when a full attendance was insisted upon, the total muster was less than 500. In itself, the size of this force would not have been a serious matter if the second line of defence had been in a really effective position. But, as a matter of fact, both the Reserves and the Rifle Volunteers had been sadly neglected, for there was no proper plan taken to keep together the men of the Reserve, or for adequately encouraging them in regarding themselves as still forming an integral portion of the colony's defences:

    The natural curiosity of the public with regard to the actual state of the defence force was, to some extent, satisfied by the publication of the evidence given before a Select Committee of the House of Assembly late in 1887. Yet, as the old Scotch woman remarked whenever she expressed satisfaction, "There is aye a something." In this case the 'something" that was lacking was a very important matter.

    The main subject of the enquiry was to discover the exact, "trustworthy" numerical strength, first, of the militia, and, secondly, of the Volunteers. It should be understood that the term "Militia" was expressly defined by the Defence Forces Act to exclude the Militia Reserve, which constituted an altogether different form. On 1 October 1888 the books of the Staff Office showed that there were in the Militia Force 853 men and 63 officers and 5 officers and 100 men in the Militia Reserve. At the beginning of the year the Militia had been reduced to 650 men all told and from that time a considerable number of men had been recruited, chiefly for the artillery, but the number of the force actually present appeared to be a matter which the commandant, General Owen, was quite unable to elucidate.

    The General's figures were, surely, a piece of very cool assumption for an officer who was so distinctly in the wrong, not only in supplying untrustworthy figures to be read in parliament, but also refusing to answer, with reference to the figures, an enquiry put by the committee. From this and other transgressions the result of the enquiry was to show that great dissatisfaction existed both in the ranks and among the outside public and it was hoped that, "during the recess the government [would] consider the advisability of introducing reforms and alterations with a view to obviating the dangers inherent in the present state of affairs."

    General Owen's term expired in March 1888 and he was not re-engaged. This decision was approved generally, although frequent changes in the command of local forces were to be deprecated. In spite of the money spent on defence the colony had not made progress in the previous three years. There was an absence of enthusiasm in the men, coupled with an undercurrent of dissatisfaction, and it was felt that if the services of Major-General Downes could again be secured there would be no doubt the appointment would be popular. Previously, he had considerable experience of the requirements of the colony and would come to work afresh with every advantage. As the local press put it, "the present is a most important juncture in the history of the force."

    The position showed no improvement in ensuing months and South Australians were told, with wearisome iteration, that "our men are badly uniformed, badly equipped, overwhelmingly officered and wholly adequate in numbers... The worst of it is that our critics have altogether too much reason on their side." The question was asked - Is South Australia worth defending from enemies? If not, why have we an expensive staff and a system of instruction and inspection? If so, why are not the vigorous young men of fairly good position in the country more fully represented in the Militia? It was not enough that labourers, artisans and clerks should comprised he majority within the ranks. It was considered, generally, that the defence of the country was one to which all classes should contribute, but this brought the colonists upon delicate ground for the only day that could be devoted to military training was that on which most of the citizens devoted themselves to the encouragement of manly sports. Thus, compulsory enlistment could have meant the abandonment of "the fierce game of football or the milder pleasures of cricket."

    If men of fitting age did on many days wander their way to the drill ground on North Terrace instead of the ovals or the river they wouldhave been obliged to learn the value of self-sacrifice; but this, after all, was a necessary ingredient of what was called patriotism. Therefore, it seemed that nothing short of compulsory service could effect what was required in the way of ensuring the growth of that legitimate military spirit which the volunteer principle had failed to evoke in sufficient measure:

    On 9 October 1888 £35,797 was approved in parliament for military defences of the colony and during the debate many members spoke out against the proposed expenditure; some of their pearls of wisdom were as follows:

    To these and other objections the local press declared them to be a delusion and a snare and stated that a stop must be put to the sham together with a firm refusal to live in a fool's paradise. Indeed, thoughtful people were being convinced that the only cure was the compulsory enrollment of men as this would make people understand the reality of the affair:

    Upon his return from Victoria, General Downes presented a report to Parliament in October 1888 in which he condemned the arrangements for defence as they then existed and spoke of the "dangerous state of affairs" as to the overall strength of the forces. He supported compulsory service and urged the government to give effect to the compulsory clauses of the Defence Forces Act of 1886 and "I think there [could] be in addition to the 3,000 in the active militia, a reliable reserve of at least 5,000 men at the end of ten years' time." In January 1889 a call for a complete overhaul of the defence forces went out:

    The debate continued to rage into 1889 and in August of that year the Register was to proclaim that "A House Divided Against Itself" was the description which only too aptly applied to the defence forces of South Australia. A report from Major-General Edwards, tabled in Parliament in October 1889, added further grist to the mill for he was of the opinion that local defence arrangements "cannot be considered satisfactory [when] compared with those of either Victoria or New South Wales."

    Major-General Edwards had been sent to the colonies to discover how far the preparations for local defence would bear the strain which the actual necessity of beating off enemy would put upon them and he came to the conclusion that they would be found to fall far short of the requirements and this conclusion he did not hesitate to state in clear and cogent language. The burden of his advice to Australians was:

    Of course, there were many dissenters to these claims and one parochial comment was that "on the whole it is evident that General Edwards has yielded to the prejudices of his cloth and was prone to trust in soldiers rather than in naval and coastal defences."

    Closer to home, the attitude of the Ministry towards the defence forces of the colony was declared to be most unsatisfactory and difficult to conceive. The course they had adopted had always been an incentive to disorganisation and it was an absolute fact that discontent prevailed throughout the forces. Indeed, the shuffling way in which the Ministry treated the question from first to last, and the cheese-paring policy they pursued in reference to it, might well have shaken confidence in their disposition to do the right thing in the matter. As a newspaper editor opined - "[We] suffer disgrace in the eyes of [our] neighbours]."

    As the 1880s drew to a close, and with peace prevailing in Europe, concern was expressed in the South Australian parliament as to the extent of defence expenditure and a proposition was brought forward to disband the forces:

    Such was the opinion of Mr H. Hussey, MP, while the Editor of the Observer traversed the pros and cons of the matter posed a question - Is South Australia worth defending? - and concluded that "we must have, besides a reasonable line of defence by sea, trained men in sufficient numbers to meet any probable attack." But there were difficulties in accomplishing this end; for example, leave of absence from employment was more readily granted on the concurrence of a great athletic contest than when it was wanted for men to "play at soldiers", as the popular phrase of the day went.

    At this time a weak army of scanty battalions marched through the city streets for all the world like the army led by Sir John Falstaff. On show days popular sympathy was with them, but in ordinary times they had to put up with the contemptuous calls and selfish jeering of people who should have known better. Indeed, it was becoming clear that, if the defence forces were not to become a sham, compulsory enlistment would have to be introduced, for unless the sham element was eliminated, and the citizen soldiers became a reality, it would have been infinitely better and safer for the people of South Australia to dismiss the officers and to become admittedly, as well as practically, a defenceless colony.

    Thus, the 1880s closed with antipathy being shown to the government of the day, coupled with other members of colonial society girding themselves for another frontal attack to achieve their perceived goals in the 1890s. While this was pending the Russians waited silently and patiently in their lair to the northwards!

    The 1890s - Towards Federation of the Colonies

    When the 1890s opened the permanent naval force of South Australia numbered 70 with 75 reserves and total military 2,481 with a reserve of 124 but, as for uniforms, they were "a disgrace to the service and dampened the military ardour of the men." The Field Artillery, together with the Garrison Artillery, were, according to military authorities, in a "high state of efficiency" but furnished with obsolete guns, while the officers had to turn to the Commissioner of Police for the means of horsing the cannon.

    The rifles for use of the infantry were, in many cases, so damaged by fair wear and tear that they were not to be depended upon, while the machine guns were altogether inadequate for its requirements. The camp equipment fell short of what was needed; there was a total absence of medical provision for the troops should they have been called upon to take the field, while the parade ground was too small for the purpose and the gymnasium and recreation reserve were wanting.

    The most scurvy treatment was meted out to the colony's defenders. They were made the victims of miserable economy; they were mocked by promises which were not redeemed; they were discouraged and flouted in every conceivable way for "when they asked for bread they were offered a stone." When they put in a modest claim for increased pay they were denied it point blank and a call went out - 'surely some members of Parliament will try to get justice done to the force.'

    By August of 1890 the efforts made to strengthen the Militia had been successful, the total number enrolled being close up to the maximum number authorised by law, and it was of little consequence that this result had been brought about by the depletion of the ranks of the Volunteers, for that corps had all but ceased to be effective.

    In spite of all the discouragement with which the Militia and Volunteers had to contend - in spite of official apathy and neglect - in spite of meagre privileges and persistent snubbing, they continued resolutely to perform the patriotic duty they had undertaken. The attitude of the government and parliament had militated greatly against them as a force, and it was hardly necessary to recall the number of appeals from the press for the authorities to bestow more liberal treatment upon the citizen soldiers. General Owen, a former commandant who had returned to England, pointed out many deficiencies in the local forces, while the Adelaide press called for the government to "rightly appreciate its responsibility ... [and] let it properly apply the powers it has at command, and South Australia will soon have a military force which will lack nothing either on the score of effectiveness or popularity."

    The permanent forces were called out and marched under arms to the assistance of the government for the first time in 1890 when a strike paralysed Port Adelaide's waterfront. They patrolled the port with 400 policemen, but nothing happened and, therefore, the colonial army's first call to duty ended bloodlessly:

    By December 1890, in some quarters it was considered that it was high time that something was done to revive the flagging interest in the colonial defence forces. There were men belonging to them who through reports, both evil and good, stood by them and did their utmost by precept and example to promote their efficiency. But in spite of this situation the melancholy fact was being pressed home more and more closely upon the colonists that the position of affairs was the reverse of satisfactory.

    Men upon various pretexts were quitting the ranks and the work of recruiting was not proceeding with anything like sufficient rapidity to make up the deficiency. The causes of this state of things had often been pointed out by correspondents to the press; that is, not only were the inducements offered by parliament to men to join the forces altogether inadequate, but the amount of sympathy and support accorded them in quarters, from which it should have derived its chief encourage- ment, was significantly small.

    Therefore, there was little wonder that the flame of military ardour burned low and appeared to be on the point of extinction. With rare exceptions the wealthier members of the community, who had most to lose in the event of an enemy's attack, instead of cheerfully taking part in the work of defence, stood superciliously aloof and carefully abstained from doing anything to lighten the burden of patriotic duty to those who undertook it. Many of them were ready to spend time and money freely in horse racing, hunting and polo matches and other forms of amusement, but recognised no obligation to serve their country.

    As a salve to public concern an amending Bill was placed before the Assembly in November 1891, but its provisions fell well short of accomplishing what was desired:

    The members of the Assembly, in their capacity as guardians of the public purse, deemed it a sacred duty to have an annual growl about the military and naval expenditure and there were few lines on the Estimates that provoked so much discussion and adverse criticism as those relating to colonial defences. However, an unfortunate part of the affair was that all the talking, like the firing at a sham fight, invariably ended in smoke. The opinion was commonly expressed that reforms were necessary, but a few reassuring words were uttered by the responsible Minister and the votes were passed as a matter of course.

    The truth was that those who addressed the House upon the question were very much in the dark. Some of them had a shrewd idea of the direction in which improvements could be made but did not press the matter home and, consequently, it drifted. Of course, no sympathy was due to those who regarded outlay upon defence as a wasteful expenditure, for the colony was neither so poor nor so insignificant as to be unworthy of protection. But it was the bounden duty of those in authority to see that the money allotted to defence was spent effectively and not frittered away upon forces and armaments that would be all but valueless in times of need.

    However, whatever the pundits in parliament decided upon, there was no doubt that in 1892 there were grievances within the ranks, for the pay for Militia men was far below that granted in the other colonies and there certainly seemed to be no reason why this should have been the case. With a view to remedying a parlous situation Major-General Downes reminisced upon suggestions he brought forward to improve the defence forces:

    Major-General Downes, who had been the supreme commander of South Australian defence forces for many years, elected to retire in 1892 and, accordingly, a cry went out as to whether his successor should be a "local" man or otherwise. The class whose war cry was "Australia for the Australians" strongly urged the claims of certain local officers and put forward Major Gordon on the grounds that, with all his faults, he possessed tact and had gone heart and soul into the study of gunnery, knew something of infantry and cavalry drill and had the capacity to pick up the requisite knowledge and keep pace with the times. Other names brought forward were Lt-Colonels Madeley, Makin and Lovely and Brigade-Major Stuart. On the other hand there were those who insisted on an "Imperial officer" because "the stability of the force would be best maintained by a strict officer of the British army, who knew his work and how to do it."

    The high grass mound, along the northern side of the modern-day Government House, known popularly as 'Majuba Hill' was, in the early days, a stone quarry. Until August 1882 its ragged face was unsightly and, to clothe its nakedness, a large quantity of earth from cellars and basement excavations, together with road sweepings, were carted there to build the present well-grassed embankment. This work was undertaken following representations in parliament by Samuel Tomkinson and took one year to complete; at the same time the ground between it and the river was raised to a considerable extent and levelled.

    The site underwent a transformation with a new parade ground being placed in the centre. In some places there was a fall of nine feet and an immense quantity of earth had to be filled in and men from the ranks of the unemployed were engaged at the work. The new military ground was 130 yards long from east to west and ninety yards wide, while metal from the Dry Creek Labour Prison was rolled in and the surface made smooth with screenings and, immediately surrounding, grass plots studded with palm trees were established.

    Commencing early in 1893 the new commandant, Colonel Gordon, was in charge and extensive economies were contrived in connection with the defence department and there was no doubt that in previous years the colony's little army and navy had been cramped for the want of money, and its principal officers required to turn out fully efficient soldiers and sailors without adequate material. When General Owen was here the cry was for "Money, money, money" and General Downe's lament was the same, while Colonel Gordon took up a similar plaint with even more pressing reasons than his predecessors.

    In all Colonel Gordon's long catalogue of grievances there could not be found any which could be fairly objected to as being a specimen of grumbling, for the sake of grumbling, though his report showed the disposition which prevailed among legislators to have a defence force and yet not to provide for it. On one hand commandants were expected to keep up a certain muster without the means to do it. On the other, colonists relied upon forts and a warship to protect the city, but found that the guns in the forts were good enough to play with, but practically useless to fight with and that the warship, as a cost cutting venture, was carefully preserved out of harm's way by being "laid up" at moorings in the Port River.

    In August 1894 the government was handed a report on the military forces but, for some time refused to indicate the nature of its contents. The reason for its reticence was evident a few weeks later when it was revealed that some Ministers had not made up their minds concerning certain radical proposals contained in the document. The financial difficulties, caused through the stress of the times, were so real and perplexing that measures for economy were worthy of serious consideration but, in regard to the wholesale impairing proposed for the defence forces, any practical man could have been excused for putting to Cabinet a significantly pertinent question - If our citizen soldiers could be safely sent to the rightabout in the face of danger, was there any need for maintaining them as an organisation when no special jeopardy threatened?

    By the end of the first quarter of 1895, hardly a session of Parliament had passed during this decade without a debate, which must have been wounding to the patriotic spirit that had impelled so many men to place their services at the disposal of the country for its protection. As the weapons in the colony's arsenals were in large measure obsolete, and the store of ammunition extremely limited in quantity, this was a particularly appropriate time in which to reorganise or disorganise the force and it was said that "it will be well for South Australia to admit, without further farcical pretence, that it has not a substantial defence force at all." In 1892 the annual expenditure of the local establishment was £55,363 and in 1894 this had been reduced to £28,000, while the provision for the current year was to be only £22,100.

    It was evident that the government intended to make a clean sweep of the Militia in South Australia and hoped to save about £7,000 on the military vote in the ensuing year. In doing so it was influenced by the opinion of the Imperial conference on colonial defences, and also of the local defence Committee, that the principal and, indeed, the only danger in the prevailing circumstances would be from "flying cruisers insufficiently manned to attempt any invasion." Consequently, it was held that that the line of defence on which the colony would have to rely would be the defence seaward. However, a word of warning came from the local press:

    Early in April 1895 a general order from the Staff Office directed the three regiments of local infantry, the lancers, the machine-gun corps, the signalling corps and the ambulance and bands to parade on Saturday, 20 April; the order required all noncommissioned officers and men to return to store their arms and accoutrements - everything, in fact, except their clothing was there and then to be delivered up. This action was interpreted on all sides as meaning a practical disbandment of the Militia.

    Further, the method of dismissing the men was generally considered as being about as awkward and ungracious as could be devised. In full view of a crowd of civilians, collected to sympathise or to scoff according to their humour or their estimates of the value of the force, and amid the jeers of a mob of little boys, they dispersed under a humiliating sense of being publicly disarmed and sent about their business.

    Thus, came an inglorious conclusion to the life of a force which, whatever its defects may have been at various times, had yet been the model which most of the other Australian colonies had taken for imitation in the more recent reorganisation of their local armies. However, it was a consolation to know that it was intended to retain the Garrison and Permanent Artillery on the same footing as before, but these bodies, even with the aid of the Volunteers would, it was feared, be "a vain thing for safety."

    In a grudging spirit the Government granted a reprieve to the Militia after having virtually ordered it off for public execution. This was evident in instructions issued by the Staff Office which, in a lofty and condescending way, told the men that they would be allowed the privilege of serving their country for nothing. It would have been a far more manly course if the Government had directly requested the men of the militia to assent to a modification of the terms of their enlistment and to serve gratuitously until Parliament decided whether the force was to be disbanded or not.

    The Defence Forces Bill dealt only with the men who might have been required to fight on land; it had nothing to do with the navy and owing to the protracted delay in the preparation and publication of the regulations made necessary by the Defence Act passed during the session of 1895, neither the men belonging to the old forces, which were disbanded by that measure, nor new recruits had been able to enroll. Thus it was that the colony found itself in the position of having "a miserable attenuated army such as that now in existence." Indeed, the feeling has been created that the government intended to act in a parsimonious spirit in regard to the pay of the rank and file and unless this impression could be removed enrollment was not likely to proceed with much enthusiasm.

    By May of 1896 it was finally recognised that the basis upon which the military forces of the Australian colonies were organised was unsatisfactory and it was to cure defects and place matters on a more effective footing that a Consolidating and Amending Act had been passed in the previous session. In the dying days of Parliament its progress through all stages was pushed on and the headlong speed, with which it was carried through the two chambers, necessarily militated against the critical examination of its many clause.

    The fact that the majority of the sections were merely repetitions of those in existing Acts was obviously no justification for dealing with the Bill in such a spasmodic manner. After the Act was assented to more than four months were allowed to pass without anything being done to bring the members of the old force together, with a view to acquainting them with the conditions under which they were to be asked to enroll and this policy of procrastination was observed to the last.

    Many believed that there would never be a resurrection, but Colonel Gordon deprecated any such prospect of despair and prophesied a splendid reincarnation, while the local press thundered:

    Enrolment commenced in August but in the face of the many other allurements held out to the youth of South Australia in the form of cricket, football, baseball, lacrosse, and - most attractive of all - cycling, it was not to be wondered that the process of recruiting was painfully slow; by mid-February 1897 there had been 611 enrollments. With this change came the end of the colourful uniforms that marked the early military history of the colony. The scarlet tunics, white-striped blue trousers and white helmets that had followed the grey uniform of the 1880s - the "Destitutes" they called the men in these uniforms - were replaced by khaki with maroon facings and a felt hat.

    The first parade of the new military forces took place on 3 October 1896 when "The South Australian Army" presented a rather nondescript appearance owing to the fact of so many recruits being in the ranks and yet unprovided with uniforms, and also a proportion of men in the old force whose uniforms were worn out and too shabby for wear. The public manifested little interest in the proceedings - it was race-day - and, moreover, the band was not expressively in evidence. A few people, probably the mothers and fathers, the sisters and the aunts of the new recruits, attended.

    By May of 1898 there seemed to be a general impression prevailing throughout the colony that the so-called military force would soon have to be reorganised or else disbanded. What with retrenchments, reductions in the number of useful drills and a lack of enthusiasm in the rank and file, reflecting parliamentary and ministerial indifference, the general efficiency of the force had been so affected that it did not inspire confidence.

    Indeed, during the 1890s practically little other than the passing of the Act had been done; the oak was still in the acorn. So, far from being improved, the South Australian defence forces had degenerated into almost a sham and this applied to both branches - naval and military. As the federation of the Australian colonies became near at hand local pundits, with both military and civil backgrounds, were to the fore and the inglorious performance of our parliamentarians over the decades revealed in certain published comments:

    Epilogue

    In the 1890s much was said and written about the possibility of defensive federation amongst the Australian colonies and various schemes, of a more or less formal nature, were placed before the public with the object of knitting together the local forces of the different colonies into one great Australian army.

    However, a considered opinion was that federation could be all the more permanent if it grew naturally out of the feelings and desires of the people themselves and, in this respect, one of the most powerful agencies in developing unity of sentiment was the frequent meeting together of representative men from the forces of the Australasian colonies. Indeed, it was very satisfactory that South Australia had the opportunity to lead the way in the inauguration of Australian rifle contests.

    A school cadet corps was approved by the government in 1900 following a scheme being proposed by Lieutenant Leschen and the one essential condition was that "No boy will be compelled to join":

    A striking feature in the history of the colony for the year ending July 1900 was the revival and wonderful development of the military spirit amongst the people, due to the outbreak of the Boer War in late 1899 and continued until the cessation of hostilities in May 1902.. Indeed, it was said that:

    However, the departure of the contingents for South Africa, naturally, left the defence forces in a depleted condition and their reestablishment was begun immediately after the departure of the Fourth Contingent in May 1900.

    During an Easter encampment of forces at Black Forest in March 1902, and with the transfer of colonial forces to Commonwealth control imminent, the Editor of the Register became lyrical:

    And, finally, a few months before the transfer eventuated, and with colonial jealousies still evident in parochial minds, the morning press had its final say on the matter of colonial defences:

    It was not until 1903 that the Commonwealth took over the military forces of all States and Major-General (later Sir Henry) Hutton was the first commander. Under the Commonwealth, New South Wales had the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th battalions, Victoria, the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th, Queensland the 9th and South Australia, the 10th - the Fighting Tenth they called it after its heroic baptisms of fire at Gallipoli twelve years later:

    Thus, the army continued until 1911 when universal training was adopted; then in 1929 the Scullin government suspended that innovation and returned to the militia system and with it the more picturesque uniform of the militia days. For instance, the garrison artillery uniform with its white helmet and striped trousers approximated most of the uniforms of the 1890s. Then, with the closure of the State's 100th year, came armoured cars and mechanical artillery, the latest and probably most far-reaching changes of all.

    The holocaust of 1914-1918 needs no elaboration here except, perhaps, for a few quotations printed in the Adelaide morning press that express aptly the views of the "average" South Australian in those far off days in respect of war itself vis a vis inherent patriotism, coupled with intense loyalty towards the "Mother Country" and British Empire:

    The exploits of South Australian participation during the wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945, together with other aspects of the defence of South Australia, have been told by other historians and is outside the ambit of this history. However, it might be fitting to conclude by quoting a poignant stanza from a poem written by "An Adelaide Poet at War [Leon Gellert]", in 1917:

    Miscellany

    General Notes

    "Echoes of Barrack Square" is in the Register,
    8, 11, 12, 14 and 17 September 1917, pages 9d, 7d, 10f, 7c and 9a.

    "Old-Time Memories" is in the Register,
    23 August 1920, page 8f,
    "Imperial Soldiers in Adelaide" is in the Register,
    7 November 1924, page 10f.

    "SA's Soldiers Down the Years" is in The News,
    27 November 1936, page 6g.
    "Soldiers and Police" is in the Observer,
    1 November 1924, page 49c.

    A history of land defence is in the Register,
    6 September 1879 (supp.).

    Reminiscences of the Sappers and Miners are in the Observer,
    6 March 1880, page 417d.

    "The First British Soldier in SA" is in the Observer,
    2 May 1914, page 42d.

    "Early War Scares" is in the Register,
    12 April 1916, page 9e.

    A photograph of "the old barracks of Imperial soldiers" is in the Register,
    21 August 1919, page 5.

    A letter urging the need for "A Military Force" is in the Register,
    17 July 1841, page 3c,
    "The Troops" on
    27 December 1844, page 2b,
    "Defenceless State of SA" on
    25 April 1846, page 2e.

    "The First South Australian Volunteer Militia" of 1841 is discussed in the Advertiser,
    10 June 1878, page 7c:

    "Soldiering in the Old Days - Evolution of South Australia's Army" is in the Advertiser,
    20 January 1910, page 11f; also see
    21 January 1910, page 9g,
    Observer,
    15 and 29 January 1901, pages 40a and 42a.

    "Imperial Soldiers in Adelaide - A Peep Into Old History" is in the Register,
    7 November 1924, page 10f.

    A drunken riot at the British Hotel in Pirie Street by soldiers of the 11th regiment is reported in the Register,
    20 January 1847, page 2e.

    A proposed Militia Bill is discussed in the Register,
    28 June 1848, pages 2d-4b,
    1 and 26 July 1848, pages 3a and 3b,
    5, 7, 8, 12, 14 and 16 August 1854, pages 2h, 2g, 3d, 2b, 3d and 2c,
    2 and 6 September 1854, pages 2c and 2g. Also see
    South Australian,
    30 June 1848, page 3a,
    4 and 14 July 1848, pages 3b and 1e.

    "Our First Defenders - Reminiscences of the Fifties" is in the Register,
    11 January 1910, page 5b; also see
    15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27 and 29 January 1910, pages 14b, 8e, 6h, 9c, 9a, 6d, 9d, 6f and 14g-15a,
    1 and 3 February 1910, pages 8b and 8b.

    "When Uniforms Made the Soldier" is in The Mail,
    2 April 1934, page 1.

    "The Last Garrison Troops" is in the Advertiser,
    18 August 1921, page 6h.

    "The Defences" is the cause for comment in the Register,
    13 February 1854, page 3b; also see
    15 May 1854, page 2a.

    Information on South Australian volunteers to the Crimean War is in the Register,
    19 and 21 December 1900, pages 6g and 6c.
    A photograph is in the Chronicle,
    12 November 1904, page 29.

    "The Militia Bill" is in the Observer, 5 August 1854, page 11d.

    Reminiscences of the "early days" by B.T. Finniss are in the Advertiser,
    22 and 24 October 1884, pages 6e and 3a.

    "The Widows and Orphans of Soldiers" is in the Register,
    20 January 1855, page 2d,
    1 March 1855, page 2f.

    "Our Military Resources" is in the Register,
    1 February 1855, page 2d; also see
    26 March 1856, page 3a-b.
    The departure of the "Detachment of the 12th" is reported on 12 April 1858, page 2f.

    "The Minie Rifles" is in the Observer,
    10 and 17 October 1857, pages 5g and 6d-1h (supp.),
    "Our Defences" on
    15 May 1858, page 6c.

    "Colonial Defences" is in the Observer,
    17 July 1858, page 6b,
    Register,
    22 September 1858, page 2c,
    25 November 1858, page 2d.

    "Volunteering in the Olden Days" is in the Register,
    29 February 1908, page 7a and
    the reminiscences of J.N. Perry